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I
In this paper, I will analyse a set of problems
regarding the HIV/AIDs crisis (and similar
catastrophes) in sub-Saharan Africa in the do-
main of corporate moral responsibility. My
intention is not to deal with all the ethical issues
that are associated with the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
It is true that if the conduct of Western
pharmaceutical companies can be questioned with
regard to the provision of drug treatment, as I
argue in this paper, we can also question the
conduct of many African governments (whether
in terms of denial, corruption, social divisions or
conﬂicts). I do not also deny the very important
role that has been played by AIDS activists and
by local grassroots groups and associations in
ﬁghting not only Western pharmaceutical compa-
nies but often, at great cost to themselves, their
own local and national governments. My focus is
on a much narrower and more speciﬁc issue,
namely, the set of problems regarding the HIV/
AIDS crisis in the speciﬁc domain of corporate
moral responsibility within a context of the
Levinasian notion of proximity (inﬁnite responsi-
bility) and the third.
Against a totalitarian, homogeneous society,
Levinas opens the way to a social pluralism,
which has its sources in the disquiet provoked by
the strangeness of the Other’s face. Corporate
responsibility, understood from this point of view,
would not reduce institutional relations to an
anonymous world of neutrality. Corporate re-
sponsibility is unconditional in the sense that to
be responsible is not a question of choice, but one
of deep liberty, the liberty of taking the burden of
the inﬁnite responsibility for the Other – custo-
mers, employees, the public at large and those
who suffer in the world.
I shall argue that it would then also mean that
society (individuals, NGOs and governments) in
accordance with the spirit of the Levinasian
philosophy of inﬁnite responsibility, could exert
pressure on corporations, such as pharmaceutical
companies. Owing to their power, they could
change their present responsibility policies to a
more afﬁrmative and engaged responsibility with
regard to those who are ill and who suffer death or
debilitation from HIV/AIDS and other prevalent
diseases in the poorest parts of the world today.
II
Since AIDS was ﬁrst identiﬁed just over 20 years
ago, 22 million people have died from AIDS-
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related diseases. According to UNAIDS, 40
million worldwide have been infected (at the end
of 2001) with HIV/AIDS, of whom 3 million are
children (o15 years of age). 28.5 million are in
sub-Saharan Africa. In Botswana, 36%, while in
South Africa 20% of the adults have the HIV
virus.
The consensus in the scientiﬁc community is
that the HIV virus is the cause of AIDS. Although
there is as yet no cure for AIDS, since the mid-
1990s, drugs called anti-retrovirals (or ARVs)
have been available to retard and control the
spread of HIV, and to reduce, thereby, the
manifestation of AIDs itself. For maximum
efﬁcacy, these drugs are taken in combination;
the most commonly recommended is Combivir
(AZT and lamivudine). Other drugs include
Viramune (nevirapine) and Efavirennz. The scien-
tiﬁc community and the UN regard the use of
such drugs as the key strategy to manage the
disease, although it may be true that controlling
the HIV virus itself through medication alone
might not solve all the problems involved in the
spread of the disease, especially in developing
nations (McGreal 2002).
A signiﬁcant drawback to the pharmaceutical
route is the cost of the drugs. In 1998 alone, the
world’s top 10 drug companies, on sales world-
wide of $108.1 billion, made proﬁts of $34.7
billion, yielding one of the highest average proﬁt
margins of any industry throughout the world
(New Internationalist 2002: 18–19). Poor econo-
mies just cannot afford to pay for the drugs thus
highly priced. Under global public pressure,
UNAIDS and ﬁve pharmaceutical companies
recently entered into a partnership, the accelerat-
ing access initiative (AAI), to make ARVs
available in certain countries through signiﬁcant
price reductions (Black 2002). For instance,
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) announced a reduction
in prices by 90%. The AAI Agreement covers not
only ARVs but also drugs to ﬁght TB and
malaria. Such a reduction in prices in certain
drugs is really not all that new – vaccines and
contraceptives have long been available at afford-
able prices. Now the EU says it wants to set an
example by making an equally serious effort with
regard to other medicines, such as those needed to
ﬁght HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. Brussels has
drawn up a list of 72 countries eligible to beneﬁt
from its scheme (Black 2002).
However, such negotiated reduction, no matter
how impressive and welcome, turns out not to be
as powerful a tool as direct competition from
generic drugs manufactured in the more advanced
developing countries (DCs), such as Brazil and
India, which possess technical and other capabil-
ities to produce generic equivalents of those drugs
for which the patents have expired (Black 2002).
This is borne out in the case of Uganda, one of the
ﬁrst countries to sign the AAI agreement in May
2000, but the signiﬁcant beneﬁts of which were
only fully realised when Uganda began to import
ARV generics from an Indian company called
Cipla in October 2000. By December 2000, the
price of branded ARVs fell by 22–70% of the
May 2000 price. By March 2001, the price of AZT
fell by 44% from the September 2000 price.
Combivir fell from US$220 in May 2000 to US$71
in February 2001, a reduction of 68% of its
original price. The triple combination of Combi-
vir and Efavirennz, under the negotiated reduc-
tion, worked out to be US$119 a month. By
replacing Combivir with a generic (Duovir), the
cost decreased to US$83 a month. The cheapest
triple ARV cocktail was Triomune, a generic from
India, costing US$40 a month.
Since then, the overall pricing situation itself
has altered – the newspapers, on 28 April 2003,
reported that GSK is now prepared to almost half
the annual cost of treatment with its drug
Combivir, to d206, which makes it much nearer
to the cost over the last couple of years of generics
produced by countries that ignore international
patent laws. However, the price of the latter has
itself lowered in the meantime; as a result, in
April/May 2003, the GSK announcement to slash
the price of Combivir so dramatically remains
expensive relative to the generics on offer – for
example, the Indian pharmaceutical company,
Ranbaxy offers a WHO-approved version of the
same drugs, Zidovudine (AZT) and Lamivudine
(3TC), for $167 per annum, while Aurobindo
(another company) offers its version for only
$128, which, however, does not have the WHO
imprimatur (Boseley & Radford 2003).
Hence, it looks as if that the way forward is via
the use of generic ARVs, but there lies the rub.
Countries like Uganda might soon no longer be
able to import generics from India or Brazil. The
issue about patent rights continues apace to
obstruct the objective that public health should
take precedence over intellectual property rights,
in spite of the fact that the trade ministers of the
rich countries, meeting in Doha in November
2001, committed themselves to ﬁnding a solution
by the end of 2002. However, to date, nothing has
ﬁrmly transpired, in spite of continuous cam-
paigning. Paragraph 4 of the Declaration of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and Public Health reads:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent Members from taking measures
to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiter-
ating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement,
we afﬁrm that the Agreement can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner suppor-
tive of WTO Members’ right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines to all.1
Under TRIPS, by 1 January 2005, India, Brazil
and other countries that manufacture generics
would no longer be allowed to export them, even
though there may be no patent in force for those
drugs in the importing countries. In particular, the
least developing countries (LDCs) rightly resent
and strenuously resist the TRIPS requirement as
its essence is to oblige all countries, whether poor
or rich, to grant at least 20 years patent protection
for new drugs, thereby making cheap generic
substitutes unavailable for that lengthy period of
time. TRIPS came into effective existence on 1
January 1995. Developed members of the WTO
were given one year to comply with its terms,
while developing countries were given until
January 2000, although in the area of pharma-
ceuticals, they were given grace until the end of
2004, before the requirement of product patent
protection came into play. However, in the case of
LDCs, again in respect of pharmaceutical pro-
ducts, under the Doha Declaration on TRIPS,
this requirement has now been delayed until 2016.
However, TRIPS does permit countries to
override a patent under certain circumstances,
such as if the supplies are limited, if the prices are
too high and if certain clearly laid down
procedures are followed. This presupposes that
all countries do possess their own manufacturing
and other facilities, which enable them to take
advantage of the provisions to produce generics.
However, many countries have no such facilities
and would, therefore, be left bereft of cheap drugs
as they can no longer import generics from those
that do. It is true that in principle the use, for
example, of compulsory licensing is available to
overcome the problem of drug shortage under
certain circumstances – both Canada and the
USA resorted to it over the anthrax scare
following 11 September 2001 to enable suitable
vaccines to be cheaply and quickly produced and
made available. However, DCs and LDCs, not
being rich and powerful like the USA, who are,
after all, primarily the makers of the rules of
organisations like the WTO and agreements like
TRIPS in any case, are not in a position to invoke
such an instrument: they lack both the adminis-
trative and legal infrastructures, the know-how to
reverse engineer the drugs (and in any case may
lack a sufﬁciently large market to justify the cost
of doing so) and most of all they fear sanction. On
the other hand, Brazil, which does to a large
extent satisfy these conditions, has successfully
used the threat of compulsory licensing to
negotiate prices with patentees. In June 2001,
Brazil won a battle when the USA, under public
pressure, dropped a case that was brought under
the WTO’s rubric against a provision of Brazil’s
patent law that requires the patent-holder to
produce drugs locally.
At the WHO meeting in Geneva in June 2001,
developing countries expressed their worries on all
these points; unless such problems are seriously
addressed and solved, no matter what ringing
declarations are made and agreed to on paper,
such countries will never have access to essential
medicines at an affordable cost, and public and
individual health will always be the victim of
intellectual property rights insensitively adminis-
tered globally. What is needed is the political will
to ensure that the high cost of drugs should be
ameliorated through a cluster of strategies, each
of which may be applied wherever and whenever
appropriate, such as the enhancement of local
manufacturing capacity, differential pricing,
transfer of technologies and generic competition.
To the credit of the UK government, in
November 2002, it announced a plan for a two-
tier system for drug pricing that would make
essential drugs available to the poor countries
at cost price, while the developed countries
continue to pay for them at the rate charged by
pharmaceutical companies. However, Minister for
International Development Clare Short’s initia-
tive was expected to run into opposition from the
US government and its pharmaceutical lobby
(Boseley & Radford 2002). And it has; in the
following month, Dick Cheney, the US vice-
president, at the WTO talks in Geneva ruled out a
deal that would have allowed a full range of life-
saving drugs to be imported into Africa, Asia and
Latin America at cut-price costs. Nevertheless, he
seems to enforce the narrowest possible inter-
pretation of the Doha Declaration, and to conﬁne
price reduction only to drugs dealing with HIV/
AIDS, malaria, TB and a few other diseases
unique to Africa but for which the drug compa-
nies carry out little or no research. To this policy,
George Bush, the US president himself, has also
given (February 2003) his imprimatur (Elliott
2002, Denny 2003).
III
In the HIV/AIDS crisis within the context of
today’s global politics and economics, perhaps the
most relevant Levinasian notions are those of
proximity and of the third. Hence, I need to set
them out in brief outline.
For Levinas, I do not agree to live ethically with
the Other. I am ordered to do so. The encounter
with the Other is both singular and disquieting.
He characterises the life of the human/moral
subject as an answer to a calling – I become a
human subject on the condition that I answer for
everything and everyone. My responsibility for
the Other is neither freely chosen nor actively
desired. It is not an episode in my biography.
Before I am even myself, I am responsible for the
Other, absolutely and without repeal or further
appeal.
Proximity is the term Levinas uses to refer to
the immediacy on confronting the face of the
Other. Proximity is felt as immediate contact that
demands a response and hence, that it amounts to
responsibility, that is to say the ability to respond.
In proximity the absolutely other, the stranger
whom I have ‘neither conceived nor given birth to’,
I already have on my arms, already bear, accord-
ing to the Biblical formula, ‘in my breast as the
nurse bears the nurseling’. He has no other place,
is not autochthonous, is uprooted, without a
country, not an inhabitant, exposed to the cold
and the heat of the seasons. To be reduced to
having recourse to me is the homelessness or
strangeness of the neighbour. It is incumbent on
me.
(Levinas 1974: 91)
However, although it is true that via proximity
and the face-to-face relation, the agent is called to
an inﬁnite responsibility, it is the notion of the
third (le tiers) that constitutes the key to social
justice.
If proximity ordered only the other alone to me,
there would have not been any problem, in any
sense, even the most general of the term. The
question would not have arisen, not with regarding
consciousness, nor self-consciousness. The respon-
sibility for the other is an immediacy antecedent to
questions, it is proximity. It is troubled and
becomes a problem when a third party enters.
(Levinas 1974: 245)
The central question here is the fact that justice is
not viewed as a formal or abstract legality
regulating society, with the mere aim of producing
social agreements by reducing conﬂicts. A society
regulated by abstract legality is without faces and
friendship; in other words, it is a society without a
true recognition of human diversity and differ-
ence, in which economic abstraction and reiﬁca-
tion are represented by so-called free and equal
autonomous individuals. In Levinasian terms, it is
a society without proximity. However, without
universalisation, how can the encounter of the
Other be at the foundation of morality? Levinas
answers this question by the notion of the third.
The face-to-face does not establish a comfortable
intimacy between myself and the Other. It shows
me the existence of a huge world outside myself.
At the same time as I discover the Other, the
potential presence of innumerable others is also a
reality to me. On the basis of this, the ethical
relation may turn into a concern for social justice.
Society is not founded on a unity of species, but
on a multiplicity of Others, in which each Other is
unique, resistant to classiﬁcation; justice is, there-
fore, not founded on universal principles or on
some social contract designed to tame the ‘natural
instincts’ of the ‘human species’. This social
justice is fraternity, but this fraternity is not
synonymous with equality or some kind of
symmetry between people, or even the certitude
that they belong to a common genre. According
to Levinas, this fraternity comes from the
encounter with the Other’s face.
The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other
– language is justice. . . . The epiphany of the face
qua face opens humanity. The face in its nakedness
as a face presents to me the destitution of the poor
one and the stranger; but this poverty and exile
which appeal to my powers, address me, do not
deliver themselves over to these powers as givens,
remain the expression of the face. The poor one,
the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His
equality within this essential poverty consists in
referring to the third party, thus present at the
encounter, whom in the midst of this destitution
the Other already serves.
(Levinas 1991: 213)
With the introduction of the third, the asymmetry
of the inﬁnite responsibility for the Other is
moderated and gives place to the possibility of
an institutional political order. In Otherwise Than
Being (157), Levinas afﬁrms that justice begins
‘with the third man’ in the sense of the third party
(Faessler 1984, Purcell 1996, Bernasconi 1999).
The third confronts us with the parameters that
are present in the organisation of human plurality
(Soares 2000). Via the third, my inﬁnite respon-
sibility for the Other is called to respond not only
to the face that is in front of me but to all absent
faces.
Levinas is against exclusion; the Other is
characterised as stranger, foreigner, widow, or-
phan, namely those who are disadvantaged as
outcasts or outsiders, who are needy and who
suffer. Our primary responsibility is towards these
people, our ﬁrst and foremost response is
addressed to those who are in need in our world.
However, no one can deny that one important
class of the excluded in today’s unequal world are
those who suffer from diseases like HIV/AIDS
(tuberculosis, malaria, etc.) in the poor developing
economies, who face debilitation and/or death
because they cannot afford the treatment either to
control their ailment or to cure them of their
afﬂictions. Proximity compels not merely each
and every one of us in the mature economies to
confront our responsibility to these others but
also, especially those who are identiﬁable within
the CIDs of pharmaceutical companies in the
West with the power of policy articulation and
policy execution, to discharge that responsibility
by changing the pricing and other policies (such as
patenting) of the organisations they control.
These individuals are no ordinary intentional
actors, so to speak, but owing ﬁrst and foremost,
to their power, their actions have impact upon a
large number of people. They have extensive
resources enabling them to formulate and
articulate certain policies and strategies, for
carrying them out, as well as to monitor their
outcome.
If the above were admitted, then corporations
might even be held to a more stringent level of
responsibility than a mere ‘ﬂesh-and-blood’ pri-
vate citizen, as its ﬁeld of action is more
embracing than that of individual agents (Soares
2003). Of course, I do not deny the efforts that
many corporations try to make in order for a
better response in terms of their responsibility and
also the effort of many institutions, namely the
UN Global Compact Principles, to help corpora-
tions towards a broader range of responsibilities
towards stakeholders.
Individuals in the afﬂuent economies cannot be
said to be totally innocent in the role they might
be playing in supporting the extant responsibility
policies of such corporations. Individuals them-
selves may not have money invested in them, it is
true; however, on the whole, they make contribu-
tions to pension funds, or buy policies with
insurance companies that in turn may invest the
money in such corporations. When pharmaceu-
tical companies proclaim that they cannot change
their extant policies, otherwise they would be
short-changing their shareholders (to which group
alone, corporations recognise legal and moral
accountability), it is then also up to individuals to
use their power as consumers and shareholders to
put pressure on pension fund managers to avoid
enterprises that refuse their moral responsibility
to other groups in the world at large, besides that
of the shareholders. However, having said that, it
remains the overwhelming case that power
holders themselves within the pharmaceutical
companies must confront the challenge posed by
the Levinasian notion of proximity. The face-to-
face relation of suffering in the Other in today’s
global village is brought into the living rooms of
one and all; there is no need to make any effort
greater than that of turning on the news to be in
the presence of such suffering. For Levinas,
compassion fatigue is no excuse, but simply yet
another evasion of the responsibility one bears for
the Other. Nor is human frailty and weakness to
live up to moral ideals an excuse. For Levinas, the
pursuit of holiness/saintliness is at the core of his
vision. The inﬁnite responsibility for the Other is
an answer to a calling; it is even an obsession, an
obligation to care for the Other. Saintliness is an
expression of this inﬁnite responsibility (Soares
2005). Of course, as frail humans, we may rarely
live up to the virtue of saintliness and its onerous
demands – failure is not, however, an excuse for
acquiescence but is simply the eternal call for
further effort. To give up striving to implement
the holy and the good is sheer cowardice. And for
the CEOs and other relevant ﬁgures in corporate
management to blame, in the main, shareholders
for their responsibility policies is, to use a
colloquial expression, ‘to cop out’.
The moral force behind the notion of proximity
reinforces that of the third, as the latter is ‘the
whole of humanity, in the eyes that look at me’
(Levinas 1991: 213). In particular, it is that part of
humanity, which suffers, that is looking at me in
the eye. The key power holders of Western
pharmaceutical companies cannot pretend, given
the evidence, that there is no direct causal link
between their responsibility policies and the
suffering in front of their very eyes. As Klaus
Leisinger argues, ‘A new social contract for
globalization with human face is an idea whose
time has come. A credible commitment to
enlightened corporate social responsibility will
become one of the most important areas of future
corporate leadership and success’ (Leisinger 2005:
593). For instance, as I have already shown, the
availability of generic drugs of an appropriate
kind undoubtedly saves many more lives than
even price lowering with regard to certain
individual drugs. Yet, the pharmaceutical lobby
in USA, as we have seen, has got the President
and the Vice President to back its refusal to
implement the Doha Agreement.
Morality accepts the Kantian dictum that
‘ought implies can’ and Levinas is not an
exception to this view despite his profound
disagreement with the dominant tradition of
philosophy and moral philosophy in modern
Western thought. If a child were drowning in a
river, but I literally cannot swim (and assuming
that my cries for help turn out to be useless as
nobody was within earshot), then should the child
drown, society cannot hold me morally respon-
sible for not having saved the child; nor would I
need to feel myself morally responsible and,
therefore, guilty about the unfortunate death.
However, imagine another scenario: I cannot
swim but I am sitting on the bank, near to the
drowning infant, and if I were to stretch
out my hand, with no danger to myself whatso-
ever, I could have grabbed hold of the child and
saved her. But, in so doing, I would have
messed up my brand-new outﬁt, and so I failed
to perform that simple act. As a result, the
infant drowned. Here, the moral judgement
would be the harsh one: I would have behaved
less than impeccably, because it is not true
in this case that I literally cannot save the child;
it is simply the case that in my calculation, the
child’s life is worth less than the inconvenience/
economic loss caused by ruining my clothes.
Society rightly judges that this action is morally
insensitive.
IV
We now raise the question: ‘Can the pharmaceutical
industry in the West (ﬁnancially) afford to make the
concessions to contain the AIDS/HIV epidemic in
some of the poorest parts of the world?’ If they
literally cannot, then it follows from the Kantian
dictum that such corporations would have no moral
obligation to make those concessions. They would
then be analogous to the person who did not save
the child in the ﬁrst scenario because s/he could not.
However, the evidence available does not seem to
support the analogy. Corporations claim that they
cannot afford to depart from the status quo, citing
the argument, with regard to the suspension of
patents, that they would become less proﬁtable as
enterprises, and therefore, less attractive to potential
investors and ultimately harming their ability to
deliver new miracle drugs based on research and
development. However, in the case of HIV/AIDS
drugs, their argument appears not to be watertight.
First, as the ﬁgures cited in the preceding section
show, the proﬁts of the major Western pharmaceu-
tical companies are roughly a third of their sales
ﬁgures, making their proﬁt margin one of the
highest of any industry in the world. Second, those
ﬁgures of proﬁts and sales do not cover, by and
large, transactions in the poorest parts of the world,
for the simple reason that those there with HIV/
AIDS are too poor to buy their drugs. Hence, it is
not as if their overall proﬁts would be depressed
should they change their ways, as they are not
getting any income from that source anyway. Third,
HIV/AIDS is an afﬂiction that affects people
indifferently whether they live in afﬂuent or non-
afﬂuent economies. It is not like some other
ailments, which, by and large, only afﬂict those in
the developed world. As a result, the pharmaceutical
companies continue to research and develop their
drugs protected by patents for their successful
products, and continue to charge purchasers a high
price in the developed economies. In other words, in
making their products available to patients in the
poorest parts of the world, the income derived from
patenting would not be affected. And should they
make the drugs available at a lower price, their
overall income would even increase. Fourth, even if
the points raised above were not to hold, it remains
the case that the withholding of the essential drugs
for HIV/AIDS is primarily in the hope of boosting
existing income and proﬁt margins, which are
already one of the highest in the world today. This
then means that their behaviour is analogous to the
person on the river bank, who failed to save the
drowning child under the second scenario. Just as
the consensus in that case is a moral thumbs-down,
similarly, the moral consensus about the present
attitude and conduct of the Western pharmaceutical
industry must be one of disapproval. In other
words, the industry can afford to act in a stronger
morally responsible manner but has chosen not to
do so, and to turn its back on Levinas’s notion of
inﬁnite responsibility, which consists of ‘hinneni’
(Me Voici) to the Other. We can say that
responsibility is inﬁnite because:
1. it recognises no distinction between duty on
the one hand and supererogation on the other;
2. it does not recognise the distinction between
perfect duties on the one hand and imperfect
duties on the other;
3. it is inclusive, not exclusive, as it fails to
recognise the distinction between family, kith/
kin on the one hand and strangers on the other,
between insiders (those who share the same
history, culture, language, ethnicity) on the one
hand and outsiders who do not. It urges one to
recognise the humanity in the Other, in all
others, not only in some, namely, those who
are regarded as ‘persons’ in the philosophical
sense or kith and kin in the sociological sense.
One should be the good Samaritan and not
pass by, indifferent to the life or death, pain
and suffering of fellow humans; and
4. one can distinguish between the positive and
the negative senses of responsibility for others.
While one concedes that it does not need to be
understood in the former sense of doing
whatever one can to render them ‘happy’, one
can, nevertheless, meaningfully discharge that
duty in the reduced negative sense of doing
what one can to relieve others of suffering and
poverty, there being a clear consensus as to
what constitutes misery.
The inﬁnite responsibility for the Other is not a
question of grasping abstract principles of reason
(like in Kant), of acting on sympathy (like in Hume),
of intuiting moral obligations and goodness (like in
G.E. Moore or Plato) or of applying a master rule
(like the principle of utility). Rather, it is grounded
in one’s relation to the Other as a concrete, ﬂesh and
blood individual whose suffering face should touch
one and provoke a positive and loving response.
The ideas behind the Levinasian philosophy
might have fallen on stony ground in the latter
part of the twentieth century, but there are
emerging signs that it may yet, at long last, ﬁnd
fertile ground in the wider politics of the twenty-
ﬁrst century. This would then, hopefully, consti-
tute progress, the manifestation of a new kind of
moral vision, which reﬂects more adequately the
contemporary order of globalisation in which
powerful trans-national corporations play a vital
role in the affairs of humankind.
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